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On the meaning of Nietzsche’s philhellenism in the European context, Glenn W. Most 
shows well how the erudite philhellenism may serve to build up relationships between 
countries within the XIXth century Europe, based on three definitions of nationalism. That’s 
the way the author understands the meaning of the ancient political framework for Friedrich 
Nietzsche1. I propose to start by Most’s comparisons. I shall differentiate a second definition 
of the root “Hellenismus” in the word “Philhellenismus” that implies a more mitigated 
panorama on a single possible meaning of the whole. I shall support this argument providing 
five reasons why, this second definition should not be neglected, in order to understand 
Nietzsche’s idea of Europe. Finally, I propose to read these reasons, which in my opinion 
justify this second sense of the word “Hellenismus” against the ordinary Nietzsche reception, 
which admits a sort of religious adulation of the Presocratics, that exposes Nietzsche to a 
simplifying philhellenic view, easily mirroring the German nationalism. We shall provide an 
epistemological hypothesis reflecting how Nietzsche’s views on nationalism turn limited after 
the end of the 1870-71 war. 
 
The meaning of “Philhellenismus” in the straight forward sense and three 
definitions of nationalism 
Philhellenism consists (1) in following the spirit of Friedrich August Wolf‘s science of 
antiquity which conceived the development of the personality by education and culture and 
accepts the Greek cultural self-sufficiency. This aesthetic and political perspective, which is 
already present in Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, is a valuable 
optic not only because it makes easier an approach to the sources of Greek philosophy and 
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literature, but also because it has an epistemological value, in relation to the difficulties of the 
process of unification of Germany by Prussia. The study of the ancient political framework 
has therefore an instrumental meaning. 
At this point, we shall consider three definitions of nationalism: (a) the national supra-
individualism, which places the nation over the individual, (b) the national unit, which 
demands the subordination of subsets of the nation such as regions, religious, ethnic and 
social categories and finally (c) the national supremacy as autarky, defined as the state of 
being self-sufficient at the level of the nation. 
The first two statements are less important. The national supra-individualism (a) is in 
agreement with the constitution of the Athenian democracy. It is however difficult to spread 
this constitution outside Greece. In the case of (b), that states that the national unit demands 
subordination in a monistic entity, comparing the Greeks and the Germans is even less 
instructive. While Prussia had to overcome cultural differences to unify Germany, the Greeks 
remain tied to an organic membership in a political community, promoting divisions into 
small city-states. This fragmentation is by itself a sign of competition involving a pluralistic 
balance of power ; moreover cultural development is visualized in terms of conflict. 
The third and most important (c) regards autarky. It drives to a form of conglomeration of 
interests between the ancient model and Germany. Greece constitutes a mirror for the 
Germans, who precisely aim by accomplishing their political unit to reach the self-sufficient 
situation of the Greeks, isolated from any external decision-making influence. That is to say 
the instrumental meaning of “philhellenism” is a cultural self-sufficiency. Nietzsche seems to 
agree with this perspective, notably by the emphasis with which he refers to the Presocratics 
as model. 
On the contrary, let us consider now, that term the “Hellenismus” directs the attention 
to the work of the German historian Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-84), referring not to 
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Hellenism but to the Hellenistic age, therefore we shall review our perspective on 
philhellenism and the signification of the political framework of the antiquity for Nietzsche. 
The differentiation between “Hellenismus”, “Hellenism” and “Hellenistic age” is covered in 
an important study published in 1836 by Droysen: Geschichte Alexanders des Groβen. 
“Hellenismus” does not mean only the use of the Greek Attic language, in contrast with those 
barbarians and the common language (Koine), but in a very specific manner “Hellenismus” 
means also the cultural period which begins from Alexander’s time. According to Droysen, 
this period melts the Greek character (Hellenic), with that not Greek from Orient, in the sense 
of the existence of a unity and of a progressive fusion. Instead of “the millenary conflict 
between the East and Occident endlessly repeated (…)” established since the times of 
Herodotus whose perspective excluded any possible unity, Droysen introduced with 
Alexander the Great, the nostalgia of a golden age that implies the origin of a new cycle in 
history. From the first edition of his manuscript to the second, Droysen discarded most of the 
passages suggesting the initial conflict and emphasized a blend between Occident and Orient, 
between Macedonian Europe and Asia2. So we can say that Droysen follows Wolf’s thinking 
of a science of antiquity, without taking into account Greek cultural self-sufficiency. He also 
opposes Johann Winckelmann’s assumption that the Greeks cannot borrow foreign shapes 
without making them altogether Greek. Droysen sees a disadvantage in Winckelmann’s 
model of evolution that goes through different phases by looking for ‘the origins, birth, 
mutation, decline and end’ of Greek art. Instead of underlining with Winckelmann the idea of 
a decline of art in Greece following Alexander, he distinguishes between the rediscovery of 
classical period art by him and the theme of decline strictly speaking. He is perhaps right to 
distinguish between these two periods: a) the Archaic which is a moment of sublime 
perfection that culminates with the works of the sculptor Phidias and the huge constructions 
that Pericles ordered; b) an imitative period, which follows the fourth centuries BC and 
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continues up to the passage of Greek into Roman art. This last is marked by artifice, erudite 
mannerism and forgetfulness. For Winckelmann, the development of Greek art confers, just as 
intimately, a political dimension, claiming that it is via liberty that art has been elevated and 
that the art of the Greeks “was great just as long as they were free3”. The period that started 
with Philip is the start of decline, because the Macedonians are the declared enemies of the 
freedom of the Athenians. Freedom is understood as the condition that makes the 
development of human potential possible in the heart of the Greek city, it is a relationship 
between political freedom and the beauty of Greek art. 
 Droysen shows however that the term “decline” is redundant in any other context than 
that of the historical hypothesis that serves to bring out classicism. In contrast, Droysen 
doesn’t assume it, when he specifies, that at the time of the Alexandrian conquests, the 
conquerors “didn’t only give, but also received; they were to learn and to relearn4”. Once the 
empire is conquered, the most difficult thing is to get everyone used to a tranquil life lived in 
moderation. Such a manner of proceeding is difficult, because it isn’t in Alexander’s character 
and it isn’t well seen from the point of view of the Greek and Macedonian cities. Before even 
returning to the West, a new world opens up to human thinking in the East. The Asians, that 
until then, were considered to be barbarians, are “men as well, with their needs, aptitudes, 
virtues, with their way of being full of healthy elements, amongst which a good number are 
lacking in those who scorned them for barbarians5”. Even if the active and stable element of 
the blend comes from the West, the most fertile fusion must be carried out after wartime: the 
incorporation of federative elements into a monarchical principal. Rather than halt before the 
grandeur of Greek culture, proposed as the model of classicism due to its mastery of the 
petulance of natural will (the Dionysian element) that originated in the East, via its Apollinian 
aestheticism, one could ask following Droysen, to what extent Nietzsche was aware of this 
new supra-European fusion when he wrote: “To enlarge oneself step by step, to become more 
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supranational, more European, more supra-European, more eastern, let’s face it, more Greek – 
for that which is Greek has been the first big fusion and synthesis of all that is oriental and, 
thereby in fact the very start of the European soul, the discovery of our ‘new world’6“. 
 Inversely, Nietzsche seems to rejoin Winckelmann when he interprets the apparition of 
the Hellenistic epoch as the decline of the city of Athens enduring Macedonian domination, 
which means an orientalisation of the world understood in a way contrary to Droysen. 
Nietzsche sees in Alexander the man that “untied the Gordian knot of Greek culture”, (…) 
and let “the ends float upon the winds7”. Nietzsche seeks a succession of “anti-Alexanders” 
endowed with the most powerful strength in order to gather and link all things together, “an 
astringent virtue”, “ein Vereinfacher der Welt”. Nietzsche and Droysen refer to the same 
metaphor, taken from Plutarch, when the former says that Alexander contemplated interiorly 
Asia and Europe “drink from the same crater”, being the sovereign of a European empire, but 
the future of this great geographic entity would belong to those who, strengthened by this 
same viewpoint, would not conquer countries but rather impose a culture. Inspired by the 
greatness of Alexander, he raises the problem of the transposition of different cultures within 
a vaster political entity. The latter quotes: “As in a goblet of love, […] so were mixed the 
elements of all nationalities; the peoples drank as one from this goblet and forgot their old 
enmity and their own powerlessness8”. Even if Nietzsche accentuates the separation when he 
attaches to Alexander the epithet of “parody” and of “gross shortening of Greek history”: 
Alexander “created only the type of the ordinary Greek and of what has been called the 
Hellenistic age9”, these explanations must at least mitigate the negative criticism that can be 
found in Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte10. Instead of being the 
period of the “decline and fall of Greek genius”, we have an apologetic appreciation that 
Nietzsche may have followed. This support is not limited to the Dionysian origin of Greek art, 
but targets the development of the supra-European fusion, as of the Hellenistic period.  
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Let’s look at the global opposition between two conceptions of the Greeks. In the first 
instance, Nietzsche sees the Greeks above all as superior individualities: a “crowd of great 
individuals11”. One can sense Nietzsche’s fascination for the Presocratics, as an admiration 
somewhat mitigated by the strong personalities separated of that period, that are rapidly 
pulled aside and absorbed into mediocre figures, in comparison to the formers. According to a 
second close examination, some post-Socratic personalities are eulogized and used as 
pertinent links to the comprehension of latter religious or moral configurations. The reason for 
the apparent contradiction is that Nietzsche borrows the notion of the agnostic and 
competitive character of the Greeks from Jacob Burckhardt, who perceives in their rivalry the 
sources of Hellenic greatness. It follows from the antithetical character of these two forms, 
that Nietzsche seems to contradict himself on the roles of eastern influences. It is never too 
clear if there is a Greek dependence on the East or only a considerable distance, perhaps even 
a danger of falling back to the Asian level. This incertitude reproduces Nietzsche’s 
ambivalence in the face of the very idea of Europe, one moment fortifying its identity by its 
link with Asia, the next strikingly marked by meaninglessness. 
 
Five reasons in favour of “Philhellenismus” in its larger sense 
The three first reasons for which, via “Hellenismus”, Nietzsche is able, in certain 
cases, to understand the Hellenistic epoch and not Hellenism comes from the invention of the 
notion of counterfeit by the Cynics and the use of it by the first Christians. I shall first of all 
define 1) the philosophical meaning of the word “Cynicism” via Greek acceptance linked to 
the usual meaning of the word “Kynismus” (from the Greek kunismos, kuôn, dog). It signifies 
the moral transvaluation, a moral reversal of values, culminating in the freedom of autarky, 
that is the refusal to accept a social role. Nietzsche explains this process, on one hand, through 
the Cynic asceticism characterized by his “Schimpfmaul” that is to say the freedom of poetic 
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expression of Diogenes of Sinope and, on the other hand, defacing the currency takes us back 
to the criticism of Christianity12. 2) The explanation of the use of counterfeit by the Christians 
rests on the influence of Cynicism starting in the Hellenic Greece up to the teachings of the 
first prophets of early Christianity. According to this perspective, Jesus did not represent a 
continuing pure Judaism but yet the influence of Cynicism. Sentences such as: “Blessed are 
you poor”, “Blessed are you that hunger now”, “Love your enemies, do good to those who 
hate you”, (Matthew, 5 : 3-5 / Luke, 6 : 20-38), “the kingdom of God has come near to you” 
(Luke, 10 : 3-16) represent a certain degree of intellectual kinship with Cynic orientations13. 
The expression “the kingdom of God” serves us to introduce 3) the third reason, at first 
introduced by Greek Cynicism and inherited by Christianity : it is the creation of an antique 
cosmopolitanism essential to the Nietzschean idea of a ‘good European’, defined as itinerant 
intelligence, neither restricted by the distance separating the big cities nor by any border. The 
ancient cosmopolitanism constitutes a first critical ethical reflection, that analyzes the 
difficulties of the passage from a Greek world, in which the polis was the dominant political 
formation, to large central states. The period of the Hellenistic age is characterized as less 
creative in political thought than in morals : while good man was good citizen, after 
Alexander most of the political concepts are set in the context of a ‘cosmic community’. 
These doctrines are a creation of a pessimism, that is widespread in mid-fourth-century BC, 
which reached its height with the Cynics. Let us precise Nietzsche’s conception of the Cynic 
counterfeit and the usefulness of these three heuristic hypotheses in favor of a theoretical 
interest for the Hellenistic age. Firstly, it’s content orientates the evaluation of all values 
towards a defensive transvaluation, with two directions: that towards an existential minimum 
and that of Cynic cosmopolitanism. Secondly, the Cynic freedom takes an aggressive form: 
“the freedom of speech”, which was a foundation of Attic democracy. The Cynic shares with 
his citizens, the courage to meet in public spaces. Nietzsche explains that a subtle Cynicism is 
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a precious help to the philosopher’s task because he finds suitable shortcuts and recognizes at 
the same time the commonplace and “the rule” in himself that he expresses “in front of 
witnesses14”. The last two reasons to consider the Hellenistic period, from the point of view of 
the ancient European soul, are to put in relation with the distinction between the ascetic virtue 
and the European cultural role of the ascetic priest that represents these values. 4) Nietzsche 
conceives ascetic virtues as fully-fledged virtues. Distinct from the religious form of the 
Romans, he is interested in the Greek Cynicism through its tragicomic understanding of the 
asceticism: “(…) a certain asceticism, a severe and cheerful continence with the best will, 
belongs to the most favorable conditions of supreme spirituality (…)15”. The Cynic lantern 
must serve philosophers to highlight a sense of freedom based on asceticism, teaching the 
simplicity of life. In contrast to superficial erudition, philosophical seriousness consists in 
assuming the Cynic isolation of asceticism, obeying norms imposed by a cruel nature in two 
ways: the daily sufferings associated to physical training and the ultimate sufferings, the 
challenges imposed by destiny which defeats men whatever happens : the illness and death. 
“A fair life leads to die happy16”. It is therefore not only a question of freeing oneself from the 
artifices established by civilization, to get an independence regarding to the acquisition of 
knowledge. For Cynicism, it is a question of taking the short way: training is better than 
spending one’s entire time reading. A life of frugality and suffering allows a soul that 
becomes indifferent to the strokes of the Fortune to detach itself of the passions. While getting 
used to frugality, eating food for nourishment only and wearing a single garment, content with 
any kind of shelter, man ends up finding his independence vis-à-vis the outside world17. 
Nietzsche is well inspired by this simplicity or absence of vanity when he says: 
“I am thinking of the first night of Diogenes: all ancient philosophy was aimed at simplicity 
of life and taught a certain absence of needs, the most important remedy for all thoughts of 
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social rebellion. (…) as long as philosophers do not muster the courage to seek an entirely 
different lifestyle and demonstrate it by their own example, they will come to nothing18”. 
5) In contrast, Nietzsche radicalizes the criticism that one finds in David Hume’s An Enquiry 
concerning the Principle of Morals, that monkish virtues are rather vices than virtues. His 
notion of the ascetic priest is responsible for a pathogenic nihilism and therefore for the 
creation of non-innocent ascetic means. 
 
Conclusion 
Nietzsche’s reflections on Cynicism completes his conception of a tragic ecstasy 
through a practical pessimism, that of the Greeks, which forms a reaction to the Sophists’ 
Enlightenment, a response still characterized by a strong rationalistic individualism, whose 
message is perpetuated up to the Hellenistic age. In contrast, the Roman Cynicism can be 
understood as an existence in community, which recalls the sectarian way of life of the first 
Christians. Existence has become religious and is oriented towards the mythical tradition and 
the worship of Heracles. This later transformed the Greek form into a literary phenomenon, 
known as the imitation of the Cynic satires19. The former brings into focus the Cynic freedom 
to refuse a social role. It is the root of an ancient cosmopolitanism, which constitutes an 
keynote paradigm of the idea of Europe, aiming five ethically pertinent notions for Nietzsche: 
the transvaluation of all values, the freedom of speech in the Cynic sense, the individual 
asceticism, the ascetic priest and nihilism. Since such a fixed group of Nietzschean 
vocabulary may be drawn, specifying a part of the European soul, it seems to me both 
powerful and plausible an argument to protest against any univocal association of Nietzsche’s 
philhellenism with a self-sufficient Hellas. 
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